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1. Introduction 
Imagine that smallpox viruses were intentionally released in an industrialized country. What 
should the government do to mitigate the effects of such an attack? With the recent surge in 
security concerns, this question has gained some urgency. The answer is not straightforward. 
The only known medication against smallpox is vaccination with cowpox virus. But a 
significant minority of individuals experience severe (and often fatal) adverse affects to the 
vaccine, such that a national preventive mass vaccination may cause more deaths than an 
isolated smallpox epidemic (Kemper et al. 2002). To make a rational policy decision, more 
information is needed about the potential development of an epidemic, and about the effects 
of different vaccination policies. 
 
Unfortunately, the available empirical data is limited. Smallpox outbreaks have not occurred 
in the western world since 1972; virus is eradicated since 1977. Most of WHO’s policies, 
which led to its eradication, were employed in societies very different from those of the 
industrialised world. To make up for this deficit, scientists have built computer models that 
simulate smallpox outbreaks in relevant contexts. In particular, a number of scientists over the 
last five years have employed agent-based models (ABM) to simulate smallpox epidemics 
and assess policy options (Halloran et al. 2002, Epstein et al. 2004, Eidelson and Lustick 
2004, Eubank et al. 2004, Burke et al 2006, Brouwers 2006). These models explicitly track 
the progression of the disease through each individual, and track the contacts of each 
individual with others in the relevant social networks and geographical areas. Epidemiological 
models thus acquire a social science component. It has been argued that this component is 
central for making rational policy decisions, and indeed, the policy recommendations based 
on ABM differ considerably from models that do not take a social component into account. 
 
This paper investigates how ABM support smallpox policy decisions, and what sort of 
decision-making procedures it supports. It uses the smallpox studies as case studies of such 
ABM supported decisions. Section 2 discusses the general ABM approach to smallpox. 
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Section 3 surveys five agent-based smallpox models. Section 4 discusses four decision 
procedures and their applicability in making policy choices from ABM. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling epidemics 
ABM are used as decision tools for a wide variety of real-world problems, for example crowd 
control, minority segregation or flood management. I will focus on the smallpox case for the 
following reasons. First, it offers clear and well-understood decision alternatives. Second, the 
objectives are unambiguous: what counts is saving lives at reasonable costs. Third, a number 
of studies with similar focus but differing models have recently been published. Their 
similarities and differences illustrate well the specific issues with ABM. Last, authors of these 
papers explicitly discuss the social assumptions of their models. 
 
The smallpox policy interventions most prominently discussed are mass vaccination and trace 
vaccination. A mass vaccination (MV) involves vaccinating a large part of the population, 
either before any cases of smallpox are confirmed (preventive MV) or after the first 
confirmed case (post-release MV). In trace vaccination (TV), also called ring vaccination or 
targeted vaccination, every contact of a confirmed smallpox case is traced and vaccinated. 
The CDC defines contacts as ‘Persons who had … close-proximity contact (<2 meters) with a 
confirmed or suspected smallpox patient after the patient developed fever and until all scabs 
have separated’ (CDC 2002).  
 
These policy options were first discussed on the basis of standard epidemiological models. An 
often-cited example is Kaplan et al. (2002), which simulates an attack of 1000 initial smallpox 
cases on a population of 10 Million. The population is assumed to mix homogeneously – i.e. 
to consist of identical individuals, who have an equal chance of interacting with any other 
population member. R0, the rate of infections a single infectious agent generates among 
susceptibles, is assumed to be uniform throughout the simulation. R0 = 3 is derived from 
historical data. An infected agent undergoes four stages. Only in the first is she vaccine-
sensitive; only in the third and fourth is she infectious; in the fourth, however, she shows 
symptoms (scabs) and is automatically isolated. Additionally, administration of vaccination is 
modelled under logistical constraints: MV of the whole population is achieved in ten days. 
Tracking and vaccinating an infected person in TV, however, takes four times as many nurse-
hours as just vaccination. The model is deterministic (it does not include any random 
variables). The results show a wide difference for simulations run with TV and MV, 
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respectively. Both initiated on day five after the initial attack, MV leads to 560 deaths, while 
TV leads to 110,000 deaths. Sensitivity analysis shows that TV is more sensitive than MV to 
size of initial attack and changes in R0, further supporting the strong results in favour of MV. 
 
Models of this kind been criticised for neglecting important causal mechanisms of an 
epidemic. Smallpox is spread almost exclusively by extended face-to-face contact. Therefore, 
it is not just the number of infected individuals that matter, but the patterns of exposure. These 
patterns are constituted by the social interactions of infectious and susceptible individuals. 
Explicitly modelling social contacts can have crucial impact on the result of a model: 
 
‘changing the pattern of connections between exposed and unexposed individuals can 
often affect population infection levels more than changing the exposure status of 
individuals in that population’ (Koopman and Lynch 1999, 1170) 
 
The so-called small-world effects nicely illustrate the importance of such patterns. To model 
them, social connections are represented as a network on a population. Assuming that each 
population member has the same number 2K of contacts, these contacts can be arranged in 
different ways. A maximally ordered network consists of a ring, on which each agent is 
connected to her immediate K neighbours to her left and right. Less ordered networks are 
achieved by ‘rewiring’ each link of every agent (in clockwise order) with probability p to any 
other agent in the system. Thus a maximally ordered network is characterised by p = 0, and a 
complete disordered network (similar to the case of homogeneous mixing) is characterised by 
p = 1. Kuperman and Abramson (2001) simulated the transmission of a (non-fatal) epidemic 
with a number of stages in such networks. They found that the evolution of epidemics 
undergoes a phase transition at some degree of disorder: while networks with small p produce 
a low-amplitude evolution, networks with large p produce wide and very regular oscillations. 
In such abstract investigations, the kind of social connection occurring in a population greatly 
matters. 
 
To include social factors into concrete epidemic models is easier said than done. It requires 
substituting a black box with an explicit decision-making model for each agent. Spaces in 
which agents move have to be accounted for, as well as the contacts and connections agents 
make in these spaces. Given a lack of both data and theory appropriate for such an 
undertaking, such modelling projects are beset with severe problems. 
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 Nevertheless, several smallpox ABM have been developed. They build the epidemic macro-
phenomenon ‘from the bottom up’ - by designing agents with heterogeneous attributes (age, 
identity) and heterogeneous behavioural rules (conditional on individual attributes) interacting 
in discrete time in an explicitly modelled landscape. Epidemic spreads develop from these 
modelled interactions, taking the infectious properties of particular places, kinds of 
interactions and kinds of agents into account. Five such models are surveyed in the next 
section. 
  
 
3. Five case studies of smallpox models 
(i) Halloran et al (2002) simulate an attack of 10 infected agents on a stochastically (trhough 
random draws) generated community of 2000.1 The community consists of four 
neighbourhoods, each containing large day-care centres and small playgroups. Two 
neighbourhoods share an elementary school, and all four share a middle and a high school. 
Households in each neighbourhood contain up to seven people. Agents are characterised by 
age, family ID, disease status and vaccination status. Household size and age distributions are 
based on the US 2000 census. During the course of a ‘day’, agents visit different spaces 
according to age and family ID, and then return home. If sick, agents stay home with a 
probability conditional on their age. Within the visited spaces, they meet others with a fixed 
probability. The model thus is a variant of the homogeneous mixing hypothesis, only 
separated into smaller subgroups. 
 
Transmission rates from infectious to susceptible agents are dependent on place of contact and 
age of the agents involved. Halloran et al. first derive a general household transmission rate 
from African/Asian data of the 60s and 70s. On that basis, they then derive relative 
magnitudes for adult-adult, adult-child, etc. transmissions from influenza data. Transmission 
rates for other places of contact were derived from influenza infection rates. 
 
Because of its stochastic nature, the results from the simulated intervention can only be 
compared with respect to their distributions, not single numbers. 200 simulations were 
performed for each intervention. At 80% MV after the first confirmed case, on average 0.9 
                                                 
1 An extension of the model for larger populations and with a more detailed disease natural 
history is presented in Longini et al. (2006) 
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out of 1000 individuals died, while at 80% TV, 10.9 out of 1000 died. Similar differences 
were found if vaccinations were administered after the 15th (9.4 vs. 19.6 deaths) and the 25th 
case (13.7 vs. 28.2 deaths). However, while MV prevented 0.5 cases per dose given, TV 
prevented 2.01 (both administered after 1st case). 
 
(ii) Burke et al (2006), based on Epstein et al (2004), simulate a single initial infected person 
attack on a town network of either 6.000 or 50.000 people. Town networks either consist of 
one town (uniform), a ring of six towns, or a ‘hub’ with four ‘spokes’. Each town consists of 
households up to seven persons, one workplace and one school. All towns share a hospital. 
Each space is represented as a grid, so that each cell in the grid has eight neighbours (so-
called Moore neighbourhood). Agents are distinguished by type (child, health care worker 
(5% of adult population), commuter (10%) and non-commuter (90%)), by family ID and by 
infectious status. Each ‘day’, agents visit spaces according to their type, and then return home. 
On the first ‘day’ of the simulation, the position in schools and workplaces is randomly 
assigned, but after that agents remember their positions. During a ‘day’, agents interact with 
all of their immediate neighbours: 10 times at home, 7 times at work and 15 times in hospital. 
After each interaction, they will move positions to the first free cell in their neighbourhood. 
Homogeneous mixing is thus completely eschewed; instead, agents interact in a number of 
dynamic neighbourhoods. 
 
Transmission occurs with a certain rate at each of the agents’ interactions. It can both infect 
contacter and contactee. Transmission rates depend on the stage the infectious person is in, 
the type of disease he has, and whether the susceptible agent has partial immunity.   
 
Burke et al. assess only TV as a first policy intervention, and MVs of varying degrees only as 
‘add-on’ measures. Results for all three town networks showed substantial concordance. 
Contrasted with a ‘no response’ scenario, TV in combination with hospital isolation was 
sufficient to limit the epidemic to a mean of fewer than 48 cases and a mean duration of less 
than 77 days. Post-release MV of either 40% or 80% of the total population added some 
additional protection, reducing the mean of infected people to 33 and shortening the mean 
duration to less than 60 days.   
 
(iii) Identity Neighbourhoods 
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Eidelson and Lustick (2004) simulate a single infected agent attack on a population of 1764. 
Their model consists of a 42×42 cell lattice, representing social relationships, not geographic 
ones. Agents occupy a fixed position on the lattice. An agent is characterised by its coordinate 
address, its identity repertoire (a finite set of affiliations, represented by integers) and its 
currently activated identity. At each time step, identities change in response to neighbours’ 
identities. If sufficiently many neighbours display an identity that is in the agent’s repertoire, 
but is not her current identity, the agent will switch to this identity. If it is not in her repertoire 
but above a certain threshold, she will adopt the identity into her repertoire. If it is above a 
higher threshold, she will also switch to this identity. 
 
Transmissions occur between direct neighbours. Transmission probabilities depend on the 
stage an infected agent is in, but particularly on whether a susceptible agent shares identities 
with an infected agent. Once infected, the agent goes through the various disease stages, 
becoming increasingly infectious to others, but also becoming increasingly likely to be 
detected and to be removed from the population. 
 
Simulation results show that TV rivalled MV if a very substantial proportion of smallpox 
cases could be detected and isolated almost immediately after infection, or if residual herd 
immunity in the population was relatively high. At 80% MV, 15 days after the first case, ca. 
3.5% of the population is infected, while at 80% TV, ca, 6% is infected. 
 
(iv) Eubank et al (2004) simulate an attack of 1000 infected agents on the population of 
Portland, OR, of 1.5 Million. Portland is represented by ca. 181,000 locations, each associated 
with a specific activity, like work, shopping, school, etc. and maximal occupancies. Each 
agent is characterised by a list of the entrance and exit times into and from a location for all 
locations that person visited during the day. This huge database was developed by the traffic 
simulation tool TRANSIMS, which in turn is based on US census data. 
 
Smallpox is modelled by a single parameter, disease ‘load’ (analogous to a viral titre). Agents 
have individual thresholds above which their load leads to infection (and load growth at 
individual growth rates), symptoms, infectiousness and death. Infectious agents shed a fixed 
fraction of their load to the local environment per hour. Locations thus get contaminated with 
load, which is distributed equally among those present. Shedding and absorption fractions 
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differ individually. Infected individuals withdraw to their homes 24h after becoming 
infectious.  
 
Eubank et al (2004) model is deterministic. MV with a 4-day delay resulted in 0.39 deaths per 
initially infected person; TV with the same delay in 0.54 deaths. Varying delays, they found 
that delay in response is the most important factor in limiting deaths, yielding similar results 
for TV and MV. 
 
(v) Brouwers et al. (2006) simulate an attack of 50 infected individuals on the population of 
Stockholm plus 1/10th of the Swedish population.2 The model is based on a 100×100 meter 
grid of Sweden, which contain households, kindergartens, schools, offices and hospitals 
according to the 1998 census. Agents are characterised by their age, sex, family-ID, 
workplace, immunity, disease stage and hospital affiliation.  
 
Transmission from infected to susceptible agents in a place of contact depends on a 
predefined transmission probability for that type of place, the stage in which the infectious 
person is in, and the number of infected present at this place. For large places, the number of 
maximal contacts is restricted. 
 
Brouwers et al. simulate four policy interventions: Hospital staff vaccination, TV, MV and a 
combination of TV and hospital staff vaccination. While TV yields a considerably higher 
number of infections than MV (average 34,77 vs. 17,43) the authors argue that this difference 
is insignificant in the light of the average of needed vaccinations (125 vs. 6897378), and that 
therefore TV is preferable to MV.  
 
 
4. Making decisions with ABM 
The surveyed papers give more or less unconditional policy advice. For example: ‘contact 
tracing and vaccination of household, workplace and school contacts, along with effective 
isolation of diagnosed cases, can control epidemics of smallpox’ (Burke et al. 2006, 1148); 
‘outbreaks can be contained by a strategy of targeted vaccination combined with early 
detection without resorting to mass vaccination of a population’ (Eubank et al. 2004, 180). 
                                                 
2 The authors plan future simulations for the whole population of Sweden. 
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The measures recommended in these quotes evidently refer to measures taken by real policy 
makers, not to interventions in a model. Yet the recommendations are based only on the 
results that simulated interventions had in simulated worlds. So how can a (real) policy maker 
justify a policy choice on the basis of such simulation results? I discuss four decision 
procedures and their appropriateness for this question. 
 
The simplest justification is to claim that the model represents all the relevant causal 
relationships of the world, and thus can be treated as a surrogate for the real system. Eubank 
et al. (2002) may be interpreted this way: it simulates the outbreak in the minutely represented 
city space of Portland, involving city inhabitants whose every move is determined by data 
derived from recent censuses, and it models the development deterministically (i.e. without 
any random variables). If the model were correct, a policy maker could take the predictions 
the model makes for each policy intervention, rank the outcomes, and choose the policy with 
the best outcomes.  
 
However, the model contains many unwarranted assumptions. For example, the authors make 
uniform assumptions about the occupancy rate of locations within a city block that are, the 
authors admit, ‘nothing more than reasonable guesses’ (Eubank et al 2004, supplement). 
Location occupancy rates crucially influence the number of possible contacts (and hence the 
disease spread). If such a parameter is determined by guess, then there is no reason to believe 
that the presented model gives accurate point predictions, or can function as a surrogate for 
the real system. Making a policy decision on the basis of such a model alone is not rational.  
 
By building a deterministic model, Eubank et al. (2004) were forced to face head-on the lack 
of detailed data about specific locations and individuals. Often, all that is known (from census 
and land use data) are the distributions of such attributes across all agents and locations. Here, 
stochastic modelling is appropriate. A stochastic model draws, for each simulation, the 
specific attribute values for each individual and space from the known distributions. In effect, 
this means that each simulation has its own model: similar in structure, but with different 
parameter realisations. All papers surveyed here except for Eubank et al. (2004) use stochastic 
modelling. They create a large number of model realisations (from 35 to 200), simulate 
different vaccination policies on them, and obtain a distribution of outcomes for each policy. 
These distributions are commonly only described by their average or mean (often not clarified 
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which) or by their mean and standard deviation (only in Eidelson and Lustick 2004 and Burke 
et al. 2006). 
 
If the distributions could be quantified, so that each model specification had a determined 
probability assigned, then the standard decision procedure under risk, expected utility 
maximisation, could be applied. The policymaker could list for each model the outcomes of 
each vaccination policy; she could then rank these outcomes with the help of a utility function 
(as a proxy, number of deaths may serve as such a numerical ranking). Last, she could sum up 
the utilities of the outcomes of each policy, weighing them with the probability of the model 
in which they occur. This would yield a single expected utility number for each policy, 
according to which the policymaker could decide. 
 
Given that the distributions of model attribute values are known, it may seem plausible that 
the probability of models is known. This, however, would neglect important features of 
models that are not constructed stochastically, in particular the model’s structure and the 
behavioural rules of the agent. The model structure specifies which attributes are included and 
which not. Because there is no well-confirmed general theory of social interactions and 
connections, quantifying the probability with which a certain model structure is true is out of 
reach of even the most optimistic model builders. The behavioural rules specify agents’ 
behaviour in the model. Again, well-confirmed general theories on this topic do not exist. In 
addition, survey data is not available or cannot be operationalised. Thus, one cannot quantify 
distributions over various behavioural rules either. Both of these features, however, are central 
to smallpox ABM. Assigning probabilities to stochastic models is therefore not possible. 
 
If the parties to the decision do not know the model structure or the prior probabilities of the 
model parameters, situations of ‘deep uncertainty’ arise (Lempert 2002, 7195). Under deep 
uncertainty, predicting the outcomes of vaccination policies with certainty or predicting their 
probabilities is impossible. The expected utility method of decision-making therefore cannot 
be applied to them.  
 
Some of the authors seem to acknowledge this limitation, while insisting that their models 
still contribute to policy decision-making: 
 
 9
‘We caution that the numbers of cases generated in various scenarios should not be 
taken as quantitative predictions, but instead as a basis for comparing and evaluating 
different intervention strategies.’ (Burke et al. 2006, 1148) 
 
How is this feasible? Under deep uncertainty, models of uncertain standing produce outcomes 
with uncertain relevance. Instead of predicting the future of the system with one model, 
investigations reveal a ‘landscape of plausible futures’ (Bankes, Lempert and Popper 2001, 
73) from a set of models deemed acceptable. For example, ‘we have designed a model that … 
allows us to vary poorly understood properties through reasonable ranges’ (Eubank et al. 
2004, 183). Such a modelling strategy has been described as exploratory modelling. 
 
‘ Modellers … make guesses at details and mechanisms…[perform] a computational 
experiment that reveals how the world would behave if the various guesses were 
correct… [and use] series of such computational experiments to explore implications 
of varying assumptions and hypotheses’ (Bankes 1993, 435) 
 
All the surveyed studies make such guesses. But while they highlight the use of empirical 
data, in particular the modelling of ‘real’ systems like Portland or Sweden, they say very little 
about the way they arrive at the assumptions that are not supported by empirical data. In 
particular, the behavioural rules are often not well motivated. The more methodology 
conscious authors argue that ‘we include the level of social detail that we believe necessary to 
capture the transmission dynamics of smallpox’ (Burke et al. 2006, 1148), but they do not 
discuss the basis for their intuitions. 
 
Even though all studies make such guesses, an important difference lies in how the guesses 
are generated. Most authors seem content to present a credible world scenario in which 
agents’ behavioural rules exhibit some resemblance to the readers’ own lives. Only Eidelson 
and Lustick (2004, 2.4-2.6) derive the crucial behavioural assumptions in their model from a 
general theory. This way, exploratory modelling gains a degree of systematicity that the other 
studies lack. Eidelson and Lustick’s simulation unpacks the implications of their theoretical 
hypotheses. If implications are found untenable (for example, if verification fails), the authors 
can go back to the theory, which provides constraints on how alternative hypotheses can be 
constructed. In contrast, if authors change their credible world scenarios, they are making ad 
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hoc adjustments. Using a theory, in order to give systematicity and constraint to the 
generation of model assumptions, is therefore desirable in exploratory modelling. 
 
The result of exploratory modelling is a set of plausible futures. How can the policy maker 
base her decisions on such a set? Two different strategies have been discussed. The first 
focuses on worst-case scenarios, against which policies should be hedged. Such a decision 
procedure  ‘develops an assortment of plausible worst cases [which] can be very useful for 
designing hedging strategies’ (Bankes 1993, 440). Each plausible model assigns an outcome 
to each vaccination policy. Instead of comparing the policies in all outcomes, the policymaker 
may ‘hedge’ and only compare the policies with respect to their worst outcomes. The policy 
maker thus applies the maximin procedure: she chooses that policy that maximises the 
minimal (worst) outcome. 
 
The problem with maximin is its extreme sensitivity to the number of plausible futures 
considered. The wider the scope, the more likely the inclusion of some outlandish terrible 
future. Given the uncertain status of many model specifications, exploratory modelling is 
prone to misspecifications. Such a misspecified model may provide the worst outcome, and 
the sole basis for the decision. Choosing policy with maximin is highly vulnerable to such 
misspecifications and requires great care in the selection of plausible models. 
  
An alternative decision procedure pays equal attention to all models, and chooses that policy 
which performs relatively well, compared with the alternatives, across the range of plausible 
futures. This robustness analysis of policies (Lempert 2002, 7196) can be interpreted in two 
ways. If ‘performs relatively well’ means that a certain policy P performs better than other 
policies for each plausible future – i.e. if the other strategies are dominated by P – such a 
decision procedure is a special case of the common expected utility framework. However, it is 
highly unlikely that there will be only one non-dominated policy, when comparing policy 
outcomes in many possible futures (in the surveyed articles, the number lies between 35 and 
200). Instead, ‘performs relatively well’ must mean that the policy is satisficing, i.e. its 
results, for each plausible future, lie above a certain minimal satisfaction threshold. 
Inevitably, such a decision procedure gives equal weight to every considered future. This may 
be unwarranted, but cannot be avoided because additional information is lacking. From all the 
procedures discussed so far, this one seems to me the most fitting for decisions based on 
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ABM. Great care has to be put, however, on finding all relevant futures and generating results 
for each of them. 
 
So far, all envisioned policy decisions consisted of pure apriori reasoning. The models were 
constructed from prior knowledge that defined what was plausible/possible. It was put into a 
new shape (agents’ attributes and behavioural rules, disease parameters) and confronted with 
other knowledge parts (spatial structure of the environment) to transform it into a more useful 
form (plausible futures of a smallpox attack in that environment). The form and information 
content of these plausible futures, as I argued, limited the use of standard decision procedures 
severely.  
 
But maybe, apriori reasoned decisions and policy rankings are not so important, anyway. 
Should an epidemic occur, there will be plenty of evidence which subset of futures it is going 
to realise. Equipped with computing power and sophisticated statistics, policy makers will be 
able to ‘swim ahead of the wave’, predicting the immediate development of the disease with 
sufficient accuracy to make their policy decisions. To do so, policy makers need to be 
informationally prepared. ABM, instead of deciding policy choices apriori, may be of great 
help in such preparatory planning. They allow the systematic collection of plausible scenarios 
and provide the conceptual framework to represent all potentially useful available information 
long before an outbreak.  Often, more information can be captured in a set of alternative 
plausible models than can be captured by any individual model. If an outbreak occurs, it can 
be swiftly determined which of the many parameters and release scenarios explored in the 
preparatory planning is actually realised, and thus which set of policies is likely to be optimal. 
Under this interpretation, the importance of the surveyed studies lies not in their policy 
recommendation, but in providing alternative models and model platforms on which current 
information storage can be maximised. The decisions the ABM support will be taken later, 
once the outbreak has occurred and the epidemic is developing. 
 
  
5. Conclusion 
Drawing on a survey of five smallpox ABM, I discussed which decision procedures a policy 
maker could rationally apply to exploit the information provided by the simulations. Given 
the input used in the surveyed studies, I argued that expected utility maximisation and 
maximin procedures cannot be reasonably applied, and that robustness analysis must be 
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treated with caution. I further suggested that the purpose of the surveyed ABM may not 
consist in deciding between policies now; but rather that the ABM are good ways of 
representing current imperfect information for the case of a smallpox outbreak. While the 
discussion centred on smallpox models, its conclusions may contribute to a better 
understanding of the function of ABM in policy decisions more generally. 
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